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A A A Ab b b bs s s st t t tr r r ra a a ac c c ct t t t
This paper shows theoretically that inefficient public expenditure can be
institutionally curtailed by an independent central bank. An advantage of our
analysis is to employ a two-country model with cash-in-advance constraints. The
model can deal with fiscal policy as well as monetary policy with considering
international interdependence. Each government decides the levels of public
goods provision and a lump-sum tax, and each central bank chooses the quantity
of money supply, to maximize its own households’ utility. When the central bank
is not independent of the fiscal authority, that is, when fiscal policy is
determined before monetary policy, the public good is oversupplied. When the
central bank is independent (monetary policy is predetermined), however, the
expenditure level is efficient. Because the government cannot decide the
provision of public good in anticipation of seigniorage. Thus, an independent
central bank can promote cuts of budgetary inefficiency.
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Recently, two topics relating to fiscal and monetary policies have been
discussed in developed countries; budget deficits and central bank independence
(CBI). The former has been caused by increasing inefficient public expenditure,
and the latter prevents it from being monetized, which gives rise to inflation.
There are the previous theoretical research on CBI, e.g. Rogoff (1985), Persson
and Tabellini (1990), Cukierman (1992), Alesina and Gatti (1995), Walsh (1995),
Waller and Walsh (1996) and so on. They investigated the relation between CBI
and monetary policy. They showed mechanisms to induce inflationary policy, and
concluded that CBI is important to prevent inflation.
We try to analyze the relation between CBI and fiscal policy as well as
monetary policy in this paper. We will show that CBI is significant not only to
prevent inflation but also to cut inefficient public expenditure. In previous
studies, however, the relation between CBI and public expenditure were rarely
considered theoretically. We need to discuss monetary and fiscal policies
simultaneously.
Now we use a two-large-country model with cash-in-advance constraints in
order to investigates the idea that inefficient public expenditure can be
institutionally curtailed by an independent central bank.1) Households in both
countries face the cash-in-advance constraints: they have to purchase goods with
                                                  
1 In Section III, we will define CBI in our model.2
the producer’s currency. And the household's utility increases as not only a
private good but a public good grows. Policymaker in each country decides the
levels of a public good provision and a lump-sum tax, and the money supply, to
maximize his own households’ utility. Hence, we can analyze fiscal and monetary
policies simultaneously, and have the microeconomic foundation of the objective
functions in the model.2)
We have other advantages in our model. First, we can examine welfare
analysis of resource allocation. We will focus on the efficient provision of public
goods supported by an independent central bank in this paper.
Second, we deal with policy in a large open economy. Previous theoretical
studies on CBI mainly analyze monetary policy in a closed or small open
economy. Developed countries are in fact large, and should be discussed in a
large open economy model. In the middle of the 1980’s, policymakers in
industrial countries argued as to whether or not they could cooperate on fiscal
and monetary policies. In the 1990’s, the point at issue was important among
European countries, especially. In Japan, the Bank of Japan law was revised to
                                                  
2 We adopt a two-country model with cash-in-advance constraints; nevertheless we don't
imply that we deny the loss function approach used in previous studies on CBI, and its
conclusion. Their approach include a priori that the policymaker’s welfare is worse off by
raising the inflation rate, were often used as the objective of the central bank. The reason
for this is that the central bank stabilizes the price level, and prevents a household
sustaining disutility due to inflation. That means that the central bank considers the
household’s utility. In this sense, our model is relevant to these works.3
enforce its independence regarding policymaking.
We will explain the following results using our model. When the central bank
is not independent of the fiscal authority, that is, when fiscal policy is
determined before monetary policy, the public good is oversupplied, because
government can choose public good provision with respect to the issue of money.
But when the central bank is independent, that is, when monetary policy is
predetermined, the expenditure level is efficient. Because the government cannot
control the public good in anticipation of seigniorage. Thus, an independent
central bank promotes cuts of inefficient public expenditure.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II demonstrates the model and
analyzes the first best solution. Section III examines the results of policies when
the fiscal and monetary authorities operate separately. Also we show that
inefficient public expenditure can be cut down by an independent central bank.
Section IV compares both regimes: one with central bank independence and the
other without central bank independence. Finally, section V is the conclusion.
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II.1 A two-country model with cash-in-advance constraints
First, we show the model. This is a two-country model with cash-in-advance
constraints, used by Lucas (1982), Helpman and Razin (1984), Canzoneri (1989),
Martin (1994), and so on. The setting follows Canzoneri (1989) and Martin (1994).4
The household in this model consumes a private good and a public good which
the government provides. So this is appropriate for the analysis of fiscal and
monetary policy in an international economy.
Suppose there are two countries, home country (country h) and foreign country
(country f). They are symmetric and large: each one affects the other. We assume
households are homogenous, live infinitely, and cannot migrate. The population
in each country is assumed to be unity (constant). Both countries produce a
single private good, whose (real) amounts of period t are yt (> 0)and y*t (> 0)
units.3) To avoid unnecessary complications, we presumed yt and  y*t are
exogenously given in each period.4) Hereafter, asterisks denote foreign country in
all variables. These outputs are equally distributed in cash among households in
both countries at the beginning of the next period.
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0 , 0 < b < 1 (1’)
where ct and gt are respectively (real) consumption of a private and a public good
per capita. b is a discount factor (the same in both countries). We assume that
                                                  
3 At period 0, the economy has the initial endowment y-1 or y*-1.
4 This assumption is the same as Canzoneri (1989) and Martin (1994). The assumption is
also supported by the findings of Alesina and Summers (1993): There is no correlation
between the degree of CBI and real growth rate. Incidentally they also find there is negative
correlation between the degree of CBI and inflation rate.5
the two countries’ goods are perfect substitutes and have no trade costs. Hence
the exchange rate between both currencies at period t, et, is satisfied as follows
pt = etp*t,( 2 )
where pt and p*t are home and foreign currency prices of the private good.
Households face cash-in-advance constraints. They need a home currency
when they purchase the home good, and a foreign currency when they purchase
the foreign good; they cannot purchase the foreign good with a home currency, or
the home good with a foreign currency.5) So they satisfy the following conditions
at period t:
mp c ht t ht ‡ , mp c ft t ft ‡
* ,( 3 )
mp c ht t ht
** ‡ , mp c ft t ft
** * ‡ ,( 3 ’ )
where  mht and mft are respectively the home households’ home and foreign
currency (nominal) demand for private consumption at the beginning of period t
per capita, cht and cft are respectively the home households’ home and foreign
good (real) consumption per capita. Households can purchase the bonds issued by
both governments in cash. We presume that the home bond is traded by only the
home currency and the foreign bond is traded by the foreign currency. The
bonds issued by both governments are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Since
the bond markets are assumed to be perfect, the gross rates of interest are equal
in both bonds by arbitrage (say rt).
                                                  
5 This is the seller’s system as defined by Helpman and Razin (1984).6
The cash flow of the home households for period t is expressed as  6)
mp bp p y p r b ht t ht t t t t t t ht ++= + -- - - t 11 1 1 2 ,






-- 11 1 1 2 .
So the budget constraint of the home households for period t is expressed in
money terms
me mp be p bp ht t ft t ht t t ft t t +++ +
* t
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where bht and bft are per capita (real) demand for home and foreign debt at the
beginning of period t, tt is per capita (real) lump-sum tax. The households pay the
tax in cash. We can also write the cash flow of the foreign households for period t
is expressed as
mp bp y p r b ht t ht t t t t ht
**
-- - -
* += + 11 1 1 2 ,







* ++= + t 11 1 1 2 .
Hence the budget constraint of the foreign households in a like manner;
mem p be p b p ht t ft t ht t t ft t t
** ** * * * ++ + + t
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Using (2) and (3), (4) and (4’) are rewritten as




-- t 11 11 1 1 22 , (5)
                                                  
6 Since the bonds issued by both governments are perfect substitutes and the home
households satisfy (3), they adjust money demand for both currencies by the cash-in-
advance constraints of private consumption. The same thing can be said of the foreign
households.7







* ++= + + t 11 11 1 1 22 , (5’)
where  ccc th tf t ”+,  bbb th tf t ”+  ccc th tf t
*** ”+,  bbb th t f t
*** ”+ .
Second, both policymakers (fiscal and monetary authorities) collect lump-sum
and seigniorage taxes and issue debt, and provide a public good. The public good
in each country, however, is only supplied to the household in that country. We
assume that the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and
private good is unity in both countries for each period. Since we suppose
policymakers purchase private good in their own country to provide public good,
they face cash-in-advance constraints, too.
mp g ht
g




Hence the budget constraint of the home and foreign policymaker at period t are
(analogous steps leading to the foreign constraint)
mpr d M M p d ht
g
tt t t t t t t += - + + -- - 11 1 () t
mpr d M M p d ft
g





** * * += - + + 11 () t
where Mt is the total amount of (nominal) money supply in the beginning of
period t per capita. In our paper, we assume tt ‡ 0 in each country.7) dt denotes
total amount of per capita (real) debt at the beginning of period t. Then the bond
market clearing condition becomes
                                                  
7 Because, as shown later, if we allow lump-sum subsidy, the larger a seigniorage and
lump-sum subsidy the government sets, the higher the utility of household becomes at the
equilibrium. We set the assumption to avoid the situation that the government increases
the levels of seigniorage and lump-sum subsidy to become infinite in this model.8
bbd ht ht t +=
* ,
bbd ft ft t +=
** .
For simplicity, we unify both conditions;
bb dd tt t t +=+
** .( 6 )
In the bond market, both households and governments behave as price takers.
Similarly, the good market clearing condition in both countries becomes
ccgy ht ht t t ++=
* ,
ccgy ft ft t t ++=
*** .
It is convenient to combine both conditions;
cgcg yy tt tt tt +++=+
** * ,( 7 )
In the good market, both households and governments also behave as price
takers.
The equilibrium conditions of the money market are
Mmmm th th t h t
g =++
* , Mmmm t f tf tf t
g ** =++.
Using the good market clearing conditions, the above conditions are rewritten as
Mp y tt t = , Mp y tt t
** * = .
For given yt and y*t, price levels are determined in both money markets when
both policymakers choose the quantity of money.
Now, we define the growth rate of money:
hM MM tt tt ”- < - () 1 1, hM MM tt tt
**
-
** ”- < () 1 1.
Then
() MM ph y ttt t t -= -1 , () MM ph y ttt t t
*
-
** * * -= 1 .9
So the government budget constraints are rewritten as
gr d h y d tt t t t t t += + + -- 11 t ,( 8 )
gr d h y d tt t t t t t
*
--
** * * * += + + 11 t ,( 8 ’ )
and the household budget constraints are rewritten as
cb h y h y r b tt t t t t t t t ++=- +- +
**
-- t () () 12 1 2 11 , (9)
cb h y h y r b tt t t t t t t t
*** * *
--
* ++=- +- + t () () 12 1 2 11 . (9’)
II.2 First best solution
We consider Pareto optimal allocation in the two-country economy as the
benchmark case. In the same way as Canzoneri(1989), a world social planner
maximizes the weighted sum of utilities of both households.
max (log log ) (log log )
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s.t. (6), (7), (8), (8’), (9), (9’), tt ‡ 0, t*t ‡ 0.
As we consider two symmetric countries, the weight of utility of each household
is equated (the weight is 1/2). This optimal solution (first best solution) is8)
cgcg yy tt tt t t ==== +
** * () 4 .
The derivation of the above condition is given in Appendix A. The solution is
efficient, because Samuelson (1954)’s rule is held in each country.9) In this model,
                                                  



















9 In this model, Samuelson rule is held, unless weights of each country is 1/2. Therefore the10
the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the private good
for the household is ct /gt (home country) or c*t /g*t (foreign country) at period t,
and the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the private
good is unity from the assumption. The above solution shows that Samuelson
rule is held in each country. Moreover the solution implies the equilibrium when
both policymakers take cooperative policies.
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III.1 A definition of an independent central bank
Actually, fiscal and monetary authorities are separated in deciding policies
whether they are interdependent or not. We consider policies when the fiscal
authority (government) and the monetary authority (central bank) determine
them separately. The fiscal authority determines fiscal policy: It can control the
amount of a public good provision and a lump-sum tax. The monetary authority
decides monetary policy: It can set the quantity of money supply and (non-
monetized) debt. In this section, we consider what is central bank independence
in our model.
When the central bank can decide a monetary policy without the interface of
the government and the Congress, we call it an ‘independent central bank’.
Hence, we define an independent central bank as a central bank that can choose
                                                                                                                                                            
weights of utilities are not crucial.11
the levels of ht and dt before the government decides fiscal policy in our model. In
other words, an independent central bank can determine a monetary policy
before the government chooses the levels of fiscal deficits (equal to lump-sum tax
revenue minus expenditure). If a central bank determines a monetary policy
after the government has already determined a fiscal policy, it can only choose a
level of monetization to finance fiscal deficits decided by the government.
Therefore, in this situation, a central bank is not independent of the government.
This definition is justified by previous research. Grillin, Masciandaro, and
Tabellini (1991), Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), and so on, which design
the indexes of CBI, define the policymaking of the central bank without
monetizing the fiscal deficit as one of factors regarding CBI. Also, Tabellini
(1987) investigates a central bank which is freed from the obligation to monetize
the fiscal deficit and as a result establishes a reputation of independence. So, we
define an independent central bank as a central bank that decides a monetary
policy before the government determines a fiscal policy.
We discuss two situations: 1) the central bank is not independent in deciding
monetary policy, and 2) the central bank is independent. The former is the case
where the government decides fiscal policy before the central bank: the
government is the leader, and the central bank is the follower in deciding policy.
Since the central bank must act under a given fiscal policy, the central bank is
not independent. The latter is the case in which the central bank decides fiscal
policy before the government: the central bank is the leader, and the government
is the follower, so the central bank is independent.12
Now, in order to keep our analysis simple, we assume that both a government
and a central bank maximize the utility of the representative household in their
own country. In other words, their objective functions are the same as the utility
function of the representative household in each country. This assumption
implies that there exist no conflict between a fiscal authority and a monetary
authority with respect to preference. We will show that the outcome under an
independent central bank is different from that under a dependent central bank
even if a fiscal authority and a monetary authority have the same objective
function. If the objective function of a central bank is different from that of a
government, it is obvious that both outcomes may be different. We emphasize the
difference of institutions rather than preference in our discussion.
Moreover, we consider two equally large countries in consideration of
industrial countries. Hence we only examine simultaneous-move games between
two countries in our model: Agents in each country maximize their objective
functions given choices in the other country. Our analysis focuses on a Nash
equilibrium. We are not interested in the leader-follower relationship between
two countries.
III.2 An equilibrium without an independent central bank
In this section, we analyze the case where a central bank is not independent in
both countries. The process of decision making is as follows. In the first step, the
government determines the amount of a public good provision and a lump-sum
tax to maximize the household utility. Fiscal deficit, the difference between a13
public good provision and a lump-sum tax, is filled by issuing money or debt. In
the second step, the central bank decides the quantity of money supply to
maximize the household utility given his own fiscal policy and foreign policies.
Finally, households choose their consumption and demand of debt to maximize
their utility under the given policies. This structure is described as the extensive
form game by Figure 1. Both countries make decisions simultaneously.
To investigate an equilibrium under this situation, we use the method of
backward induction. So, in the first place, we solve the household’s optimization
problem. The home household’s problem is as follows.
max
{,} cb tt
 (1) s.t. (9) given    gt, tt, dt, ht, g*t, t*t, d*t, h*t.
The first-order conditions reduce to
cr c tt t = -- b 11 . (10)
The derivation of the above condition is given in Appendix B. The foreign
household’s problem is similarly
max
{,} cb tt
** (1’) s.t. (9’) given    gt, tt, dt, ht, g*t, t*t, d*t, h*t.
The first-order conditions reduce to
cr c tt t
*
--
* = b 11 . (10’)
We can interpret (10) or (10’) as the response function of the household.
The central bank chooses the amount of money or debt supply as given (10) or
(10’), its own government’s policy, and policies in the other country. Then the
home central bank’s problem is given by
max
{,} hd tt
 (1) s.t. (8), (9), (10) given    gt, tt, g*t, t*t, d*t, h*t.14
The first-order conditions reduce to
gc tt = 2 , (11)
gr g tt t = -- b 11 . (12)
(12) is equivalent of (10). Then (12) will be omitted hereafter. Using (8), (9), and
(11), the response function of the home central bank is written as
hy g y h y b r b tt t t t t t t t t =- - + + - - -
**
-- 212 11 t () ( )
dg y h y b r br d tt t t t t t t tt t =+ - - - +- +
**
-- - - 21 2 11 1 1 t () ( ) . (13)
where bt in (13) implicitly satisfies (10).
In the same way, the foreign central bank’s problem is given by
max
{,} hd tt
** (1’) s.t. (8’),(9’), (10’) given    gt, tt, dt, ht, g*t, t*t.
The first-order conditions reduce to
gc tt
** = 2 , (11’)
gr g tt t
*
--
* = b 11 . (12’)
(12’) is equivalent of (10’). Then (12’) will be omitted henceforth. Using (8), (9),
and (11), the response function of the foreign central bank is written as
hy g y h y b r b tt t t t t t t t t
** * * * *
--
* =- - + + - - - 21 2 11 t () ( )
dg y h yb r br d tt t t t tt t tt t




* =+ - - - +- + 21 2 11 1 1 t () ( ) . (13’)
where b*t in (13’) implicitly satisfies (10’).
Finally, each government decides fiscal policy. The home government’s
objective is
max
{,} gtt t  (1) s.t. (8), (9), (10), (13), tt ‡ 0 given  g*t, t*t, d*t, h*t.
This implies the lower tt is, the better it becomes. Hence, it sets tt = 0, and15





* =+ - - - -
1
2
12 11 1 1 {( ) ( ) } (14)
where bt in (14) implicitly satisfies (10), and dt in (14) implicitly satisfies (13).




 (1’) s.t. (8’), (9’), (10’), (13’), t*t ‡ 0 given  gt, tt, dt, ht.
Similarly, it sets t*t = 0, and





* =+ - - - -
1
2
12 11 1 1 {( ) ( ) } (14’)
where b*t in (14’) implicitly satisfies (10’), and d*t in (14’) implicitly satisfies (13’).
Now, we discuss a Nash equilibrium under the above system in both countries.
(11) and (11’) are always held with any policy. These imply that this equilibrium
is not efficient: these don’t satisfy Samuelson rule. Why does the equilibrium
become inefficient? In the above system, each government predetermines the
provision of public good. We now consider the case that the home government
raises gt. In order to finance it, the home government can levy a lump-sum tax or
delegate financing fiscal deficits to the home central bank. If tt increases by one
unit for an increase of gt,  ct has to decrease by one unit in (9). While if htyt
increases by one unit, gt increases by one unit in (8) and ct decreases a half unit in
(9). Therefore the home government prefers a seigniorage tax to a lump-sum tax,
and collects this seigniorage tax from the foreign household excessively. Because,
in this case, gt increases by one unit and ct decreases half unit, that is, this
relationship does not satisfy Samuelson rule.
Incidentally, from (11) and (11’), the government debts have no effect on both
private and public goods consumption: Obviously the Ricardian equivalence is16
held. Then we assume dt = d*t = 0 without loss of generality. So bt = b*t = 0. Since
they are symmetric, from (7), (11), and (11’), the quantity of consumption is
cc yy tt tt == +
** () 6 ,
gg yy tt t t ==+
** () 3 .
The policies of the central banks are, in this equilibrium,
hy yy tt tt =+
* () 3 , hy yy tt tt
** * =+ () 3 .
III.3 An equilibrium with an independent central bank
Next, we analyze the case where the central bank is independent in both
countries. The process of decision making is as follows. In the first step, the
central bank decides the quantity of money supply to maximize household utility.
In the second step, the government determines the amount of a public good
provision and a lump-sum tax to maximize household utility given its own
monetary policies and foreign policies. Since the money supply is predetermined,
the amount of a public good provision must be equal to a lump-sum tax and
money or debt. Finally, households choose their consumption and demand of debt
to maximize their utility are given policies. This structure is described as the
extensive form game by Figure 2. Both countries make decisions simultaneously.
We discuss an equilibrium under this situation. The household’s optimization
problems that we solve first are the same as in section III.2. So we already gain
the condition (10) and (10’).
In the second stage, the government chooses the amount of public good
provision and lump-sum tax given (10) or (10’), its own central bank’s policy, and17
policies in the other country. Then the home government’s problem is presented
by
max
{,} gtt t  (1) s.t. (8), (9), (10), tt ‡ 0 given  dt, ht, g*t, t*t, d*t, h*t.
From the first-order conditions, we obtain (12), and
gc tt = . (15)
The derivation of the above condition is given in Appendix C. We can interpret
(15) as the response function of the home government.




 (1’) s.t. (8’), (9’), (10’), t*t ‡ 0 given  gt, tt, dt, ht, d*t, h*t.
and, we obtain (12), and
gc tt
** = . (15’)
We can interpret (15’) as the response function of the foreign government.




 (1) s.t. (8), (9), (10), (15) given    g*t, t*t, d*t, h*t.
This implies that the larger ht or dt is, the better its utility becomes. So it sets
hy d g y h y b r b r d tt t t t t t t t t t t +=- - - +- +
**
-- - - 24 1 2 2 11 1 1 () ( ) , (16)
or
324 1 2 2 11 1 1 hy d y h y b r b r d tt t t t t t t t t t t += - + + - -- +
**
-- - - t () ( ) .
The home central bank follows (16) and decides the amount of home money
supply.
In a like manner, the foreign central bank’s problem reduces to18
max
{,} hd tt
** (1’) s.t. (8’), (9’), (10’), (15’) given    gt, tt, dt, ht.
This implies that the larger h*t or d*t is, the better the utility of the foreign
household becomes. So the foreign central bank sets
hy d g y h y b r b r d tt t t t t t t t t t t




* +=- - - +- + 24 1 2 2 11 1 1 () ( ) , (16’)
or
324 1 2 2 11 1 1 hy d y h y b r b r d tt t t t t t t t t t t




* += - + + - -- + t () ( )
The foreign central bank follows (16’) and decides the amount of foreign money
supply.
Now, we analyze a Nash equilibrium under the above system in both countries.
According to (15) and (15’), these are consistent with the Pareto optimal
allocation. In other words, Samuelson rules are held in both countries.
Moreover, to compare with the levels in section III.2, we suppose the
governments set tt = t*t = 0. From (10), (10’), (15), and (15’), the government debts
have no effect on both private and public goods consumption: Obviously the
Ricardian equivalence is held again. Then we assume dt = d*t = 0 without loss of
generality. So bt = b*t = 0. Since they are symmetric, from (7), (15), and (15’), the
amount of consumption is
cgcg yy tt tt t t ==== +
** * () 4 .
In this equilibrium, the central banks choose
hy yy tt tt =+
* () 4 , hy yy tt tt
** * =+ () 4 .
These imply the growth rates of money supply are lower than the rate in section
III.2; this is inefficient. Why does this equilibrium become efficient? In the above
system, each government determines the provision of public good after deciding19
on monetary policies. We now consider the case that the home government raises
gt. In order to finance, it can only levy a lump-sum tax. If gt increases by one unit,
tt has to increase by one unit in (8). Then ct decreases by one unit in (9). Since the
relationship between increase of gt and decrease of ct  becomes one-to-one,
Samuelson rule is satisfied. Thus, inefficient budgets are curtailed by an
independent central bank.
These results also suggest that even if policymakers in both countries are not
cooperative in their policies, the achieved equilibrium is Pareto optimal when the
central bank is independent of the government in both countries.
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What is the equilibrium if the central bank is not independent in either
country? Now, consider in the situation where the home central bank is not
independent and the foreign central bank is independent. Using the above
results, the home policies are presented by (11), (14), and tt = 0, and the foreign
are (15’) and (16’). Then assuming t*t = 0, dt = d*t = 0, and bt = b*t = 0, we obtain
ccg yy tt t tt === +
** * () 5 ,
gy y tt t =+
* 25 () .
The derivation of the above conditions is given in Appendix D. These suggest
that, in this equilibrium, home households become better off and foreign
households become worse off than when both central banks are independent. We20
gain the symmetric result when the foreign central bank is not independent and
the home is independent. Table 1 shows the above results. It implies the game in
this paper is the prisoners’ dilemma. If either central bank is not independent,
the equilibrium does not achieve Pareto optimal allocation. Moreover, the
equilibrium is stable where both countries adopt the system in which the central
bank is not independent.
If both countries adopt the system in which the central bank is independent,
the equilibrium can achieve Pareto optimal allocation. Therefore CBI is
significant in compelling the fiscal authority to provide public good efficiently.
V V V V.  .  .  . C C C Co o o on n n nc c c cl l l lu u u ud d d di i i in n n ng  g  g  g r r r re e e em m m ma a a ar r r rk k k ks s s s
This paper discusses the relationship between fiscal and monetary policies,
using a two-country cash-in-advance model. When the central bank is not
independent of the government, that is, when fiscal policy is predetermined, the
public good is oversupplied. Because the government can decide public good
provision in anticipation of money supply. It forces the central bank to finance
fiscal deficit. Furthermore, the central bank substantially monetizes the fiscal
deficit, if it is forced. The fiscal deficit can be filled with a seigniorage tax which
is the source of inefficiency, and a policymaker in one country has the incentive
to levy with seigniorage tax upon citizens in the other country. In other words,
each government decides fiscal policy without considering the negative21
externality of seigniorage to the other country. Hence the growth rate of money
supply is excessively high and the public good is oversupplied.
When the central bank is independent, monetary policy is predetermined,
however, the expenditure level is efficient. Because the government cannot
decide fiscal policy in anticipation of seigniorage. The central bank decides a
monetary policy considering the response of the government. It sets the money
supply rule. Moreover the government's only control is to levy a lump-sum tax in
order to provide a public good. Also a lump-sum tax is not a distortionary tax. So
the government appropriately collects the fiscal revenue. Therefore the public
good is efficiently supplied.
We show that inefficient public expenditure can be cut down by an
independent central bank. Notice that the role of the independent central bank is
not to prevent budget deficits from monetizing, but to make the government
observe Samuelson rule. So the provision of the public good is efficient. These
findings is different from those of previous works.
As mentioned by previous studies, the main role of the central bank is the
stabilization of the price level by controlling money supply or interest rates. To
carry this out, it is necessary that the central bank be independent of the
government or any political pressure. An independent central bank can prevent
high inflation and fiscal deficits from monetizing.
We obtain a policy implication from our result. When the central bank is
independent in each country, this equilibrium is Pareto efficient, even if each
policymaker does not cooperate to decide its policies each other. We also say CBI22
is significant for efficiency when international policy coordination fails in world
economy. In the middle of the 1980’s, industrial countries cooperated to decide
monetary policies in order to depreciate the value of dollar. This cooperation,
however, did not fully succeed. After that, they moved onto CBI. Our result
implies that it is important for budgetary efficiency that all policymakers
establish independent central banks.
This paper shows CBI is important not only because the central bank averts
high inflation and monetizing but also because inefficient public spending is
curtailed. In other words, CBI becomes a commitment device for budget cuts. The
source of inefficiency is not monetizing the fiscal deficit but excessive collection of
seigniorage in our model. If policymakers create excessively high inflation rates,
and collect more seigniorage, then policymakers excessively increase the
quantity of a public good and the household decreases its consumption of a
private good.10) Moreover the cause of excessive collection is that each
government decides fiscal policy without considering the negative externality of
seigniorage on the other country. Therefore, CBI is important because an
independent central bank can play a role in preventing it.
R R R Re e e ef f f fe e e er r r re e e en n n nc c c ce e e es s s s
                                                  
10 In this model, money does not affect output that is exogenous, and the money illusion does
not occur. If policymakers heighten the growth rate of money, the inflation rate increases at
the same rate when output is constant. Money is used for exchange and the collection of tax.23
Alesina, A. and R. Gatti (1995) “Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation
at No Cost?,” American Economic Review, vol.85, pp.196-200.
Alesina, A. and L.H. Summers (1993) “Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence,” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, vol.25, pp.151-162.
Canzoneri, M.B. (1989) “Adverse Incentives in the Taxation of Foreigners,”
Journal of International Economics, vol.27, pp.283-297.
Cukierman, A. (1992) Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence:
Theory and Evidence, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Cukierman, A., S.B. Webb and B. Neyapti (1992) “Measuring the
Independence of Central Banks and its Effect on Policy Outcomes,”
World Bank Economic Review, vol.6, pp.353-398.
Doi, T. (1997) “International Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Policy:
Fiscal Deficit and Central Bank Independence,” presented at the 1997 Annual
Meeting of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics.
Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro and G. Tabellini (1991) “Political and Monetary
Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,”
Economic Policy vol.13, pp.340-392.
Helpman, E. and A. Razin (1984) “The Role of Saving and Investment in
Exchange Rate Determination under Alternative Monetary
Mechanisms,”  Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.31, pp.271-298.
Lucas, R.E., Jr. (1982) “Interest Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-24
Country World,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.10, pp.335-359.
Martin, P. (1994) “Monetary Policy and Country Size,” Journal of
International Money and Finance, vol.13, pp.573-586.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1990) Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and
Politics, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Rogoff, K. (1985) “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate
Monetary Target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.100, pp.1169-
1189.
Samuelson, P. (1954) “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol.36, pp.273-291.
Tabellini, G. (1987) “Central Bank Reputation and the Monetization of Deficits:
The 1981 Italian Monetary Reform,” Economic Inquiry, vol.25, pp.185-200.
Waller, C.J. and C.E. Walsh (1996) “Central-Bank Independence, Economic
Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths,” American Economic Review,
vol.86, pp.1139-1153.
Walsh, C.E. (1995) “Optimal Control for Central Bankers,” American
Economic Review, vol.85, pp.150-167.25
T T T Tab ab ab abl l l le  e  e  e 1 1 1 1















































yyyy tt tt ++
**
63
the upper row:(, ) cg tt ,and the lower row:(, ) cg tt
**  in each cell.26
F F F Fi i i ig g g gu u u ur r r re  e  e  e 1 1 1 1
The Timing of Decision Making When A Central Banks Is Not Independent
in each period
F F F Fi i i ig g g gu u u ur r r re  e  e  e 2 2 2 2
The Timing of Decision Making When A Central Banks Is Independent
in each period
gt, tt
G G G Go o o ov v v ve e e er r r rn n n nm m m me e e en n n nt t t t H H H Ho o o ou u u us s s se e e eh h h ho o o ol l l ld d d d C C C Ce e e en n n nt t t tr r r ra a a al  l  l  l B B B Ba a a an n n nk k k k
ht, dt ct, bt
gt, tt
G G G Go o o ov v v ve e e er r r rn n n nm m m me e e en n n nt t t t H H H Ho o o ou u u us s s se e e eh h h ho o o ol l l ld d d d C C C Ce e e en n n nt t t tr r r ra a a al  l  l  l B B B Ba a a an n n nk k k k
ht, dt ct, bt27
A A A App pp pp ppe e e en n n nd d d di i i ix  x  x  x A A A A:  :  :  : T T T Th h h he  e  e  e d d d de e e er r r ri i i iv v v va a a at t t ti i i io o o on  n  n  n o o o of  f  f  f t t t th h h he  e  e  e f f f fi i i ir r r rs s s st  t  t  t b b b be e e es s s st  t  t  t s s s so o o ol l l lu u u ut t t ti i i io o o on n n n
The corresponding Lagrange function is expressed as
L c g c g yycgcg
h y d g rd h y d g rd
hy hy rb c b
hy
t
tt tt t t t t t t t t
t t tttt t t t t ttt t t t
tt t t t t t t t t
tt t
=+ + + + + - - - -
+ ++-- + ++--
+ - +- + ---
+- + -













[{ (log log ) (log log )} ( )
() ( )











hy rb c b tt tt t t t
**
--
** * * +- - - )} ] 2 11 t
,


























































































































































** =- + =
1
1 0.
Hence  mt = m*t = lt = l*t. So cgcg tt tt ===
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The corresponding Lagrange function of the home household is given as
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So ct can be expressed as the function of  b, rt-1, rt-2,  …, r-1, and c-1. Hereafter, ct
and bt in (9) are assumed to satisfy (10).
The corresponding Lagrange function of the home central bank is given as
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Then these satisfy (11) and (12).
Substituting (8) into (9),
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And substituting (8) into the above equation,
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Moreover substituting (11) into the above equation
gy h y b r b r d tt t t t t t t t t =- + + - - - -
**
-- - - {( ) () } t 12 2 11 1 1
Therefore the optimization problem of the home government is rewritten as
max
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given  g*t,  t*t, d*t, h*t.
The corresponding problem of the home government is rewritten as
uy h y b r b r d
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**
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Then  tt = 0. Therefore gt is given as (14). Analogous steps lead to the foreign.
In this equilibrium, if dt = 0 and bt = 0, from (8) gt = htyt, and from (9) gt = (yt
+ y*t)/2 -h*ty*t/2. Similarly, if d*t = 0 and b*t = 0, from (8’) g*t = h*ty*t, and from
(9’) g*t = (yt + y*t)/2 - htyt/2. Moreover,
g yy g yy yy g t tt t tt tt t = +- = +- ++
** * * () () () 22 2 44 .
So  gy y tt t =+
* () 3  and cy y tt t =+
* () 6 . From tt = 0,  ht = () yy y tt t +
* 3 .
Similarly,
gy y g y y y y g t tt t tt tt t
** * * * = +- = +- ++ () () () 22 2 44 .
So  gy y tt t
** =+ () 3  and  cy y tt t
** =+ () 6 . From  t*t = 0,  hy yy tt tt
** * =+ () 3 . These
quantities, ct, gt, c*t, and g*t, satisfy (7).30
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The first order condition of the home household is given as (10). Hereafter
we presume ct and bt in (9) satisfy (10).
The corresponding Lagrange function of the home government is given as
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Then these satisfy (15). Also it sets  tt = gt -htyt -dt + rt-1dt-1
Substituting (8) and (15) into (9),
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**
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given  g*t,  t*t, d*t, h*t.
The corresponding problem of the home central bank is rewritten as
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This implies that the larger ht or dt is, the better its utility becomes. So it sets
(16). Analogous steps lead to the foreign.
In this equilibrium, if  tt = 0, dt = 0, and bt = 0, from (8) gt = htyt, and from (9)
gt = (yt + y*t)/3 -h*ty*t/3. Similarly, if  t*t = 0, d*t = 0, and b*t = 0, from (8’) g*t =
h*ty*t, and from (9’) g*t = (yt + y*t)/3 - htyt/3. Moreover,
gy y g y y y y g tt t t t t t t t =+ - =+ -+ +
** * * () () () 33 3 99 .
So  gy y tt t =+
* () 4  and cy y tt t =+
* () 4 . From tt = 0,  ht = () yy y tt t +
* 4 .
Similarly,
gy y g y y y y g t tt t tt tt t
** * * * =+ - =+ -+ + () () () 33 3 99 .
So  gy y tt t
** =+ () 4  and  cy y tt t
** =+ () 4 . From  t*t = 0, h*t =() yy y tt t +
** 4 . These
quantities, ct, gt, c*t, and g*t, satisfy (7).
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We now presume dt = d*t = 0 and bt = b*t = 0. Using the above results, the
home policies are presented by (11), (14), and tt = 0. Namely, gt = 2ct,  tt = 0,
and gt = htyt. From (9), gt = (yt + y*t)/2 -h*ty*t/2. The foreign policymaker are
(15’) and (16’). The foreign is assumed to set  t*t = 0. Namely, g*t = c*t,  t*t = 0,
and g*t = h*ty*t. From (9’), g*t = (yt + y*t)/3 - htyt/3. Then we obtain
g yy g yy yy g t tt t tt tt t =+ - =+ -+ +
** * * () () () 22 2 66 .32
So  gy y tt t =+
* 25 ()  and  cy y tt t =+
* () 5 . Similarly,
gy y g y y y y g tt t t t t t t t
** * * * =+ - =+ -+ + () () () 33 3 66 .
Then  gc yy tt tt
** * == + () 5 . These quantities, ct, gt, c*t, and g*t, satisfy (7).